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When it comes to public attention, plants usually have a low profile compared to charismatic mammals such as pandas, rhinos and elephants. Prunus africana, the only African wild relative of peaches, plums and almonds, is an exception. In the 1990s, P. africana trade was discussed in British parliament, with P. africana becoming a "flagship" species for DFID (Page 2003) . The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) even suggested that just as the giant panda was a symbol for protecting endangered animals, so P. africana was the icon for saving threatened trees (Futureharvest 2000; Page 2003) . Although P. africana is listed in the IUCN Red List as a vulnerable species, thousands of plant species are far more threatened (1490 critically endangered and 2239 endangered) (WCMC 1998) . In addition, hundreds of African plant species are traded nationally for medicinal purposes, many far more threatened than P. africana (Cunningham 1991 (Cunningham , 1993 Williams 2007) . So why has P. africana become the focus of so much attention? One reason is the commercial value placed on P. africana bark. More wild harvested bark is internationally traded from P. africana than from any other species, with attention drawn to P. africana after a review which showed the extent of trade (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993) . A second reason is that in 2007, due to concerns about unsustainable wild harvest, the European Union (EU) instituted an import ban on P. africana bark.1 In 1995, when P. africana was added to CITES Appendix II, 2 this was a high-profile decision as most (95%) of the 1398 t exported from Cameroon was to Europe (mainly France [68.7%] and Spain [26.6%] ) (MINOF 2013) . In 2012, due to zero quotas granted by CITES to Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya and Madagascar, Cameroon currently supplies 72.6% of the global supply of P. africana bark (658.7 t); the remainder comes from Uganda (176.2 t) and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (72 t), (CITES 2012) . This was based on the need for "Non-detriment findings" (NDF) in Article 4 of EU Regulation No. 338/97: Trade in specimens of Appendix II species may only take place if that trade is not detrimental to the survival of the species or its population in the wild. That the trade is non-detrimental has to be certified by the relevant authorities of the exporting countries and by the importing countries of the EU.
Since its CITES Appendix II listing in 1995, over 50 research publications and 13 postgraduate theses (the majority by Cameroonian graduates) have been produced on P. africana (Anoncho 2014; Avana 2006; Bellekwang 2006; Buchwalt 1996; Duone 2008; Ekane 2005; Ingram 2014; Ndam 1998; Nkeng 2009; Ntsama 2008; Stewart 2001; Tassé 2006; Wazinski 2001 ). Yet there remains a major divide between these research products and practical conservation action. Knight et al. (2008) and Habel et al. (2013) refer to this as the 'knowing-doing gap', where research results are not translated into practical management. Cameroon's National Plan for P. africana ) is being considered as a model for replication elsewhere, including the precedent of allowing commercial harvest within protected areas (Mount Cameroon National Park). Despite the ecological values of P. africana in globally significant conservation areas, including in the diet of rare and often endemic birds and primates such as red colobus (Chapman and Chapman 1999; Chapman et al. 2003 ) and black-and-white colobus (Fashing 2009) , there is growing pressure for commercial P. africana harvest in the Albertine Rift. Examples of this are the inventory of P. africana stocks in Kibira National Park, Burundi (Betti et al. 2013 ) and commercial P. africana harvest adjacent to Kahuzi-Biega and Virunga National Parks in eastern DRC. We suggest that it is time for a reality check with regard to the wild harvest of P. africana. This research study therefore centers around the following four questions. 
Methods
We used several approaches in this study, combining our experience in working with P. africana over a 30-year period with a thorough literature review and updated trade data with "ground-truthing" in the field in 2013 and 2014. This enabled us to get a perspective on trade volumes , bark prices (and value-chain data) and the gaps between research reports and practice. Understanding why there is a "knowing but not doing" gap in the P. africana case requires scrutiny beneath the surface of national "policy theatre", where there is considerable "talking but not doing". Understanding the links between capital accumulation and political power is a key. The role of political elites is converting natural resources into political and financial capital is well-known since Sahlins' (1966) seminal study of "big men" in Melanesia and Polynesia. Two approaches provide excellent lenses for a deeper understanding of policy failure and the "knowingdoing gap" in the P. africana case. First, we took a similar approach to Médard's (1992) analyses of power, politics and African development. Second, we examined studies of commodity chains that assess the power relations that coalesce around different commodities (Ribot 1998; Ribot and Peluso 2003) , similar to the approach used to study P. africana trade in Madagascar (Neimark 2010 
Results

'Mind the gap'
On the surface, the "knowing-doing gap" for P. africana seems relatively insignificant compared to the chasm between research effort versus effective conservation action on rhino species, for example (Linklater 2003 of the North West and South West of Cameroon has been significant over the last three decades" ) and that "for harvesters, Prunus africana is generally very profitable, equivalent to FCFA 3100 (USD 7.03 ) per day, well over a USD 2 a day poverty line" (Ingram 2014) need to be reconsidered.
In reality, P. africana bark harvests benefit just 0.0004% of the local population around Mount Cameroon. No local people benefit directly from bark exploitation from Tchabal Mbabo, as all harvesters are outsiders to the area (Betti 2010). Annual per capita income to harvesters is between USD 356 (our study) and USD 374 (Ingram 2014) , an average of USD 0.98-1.02 per day. In SW, W & NW Cameroon, households benefit from diverse assets, including migrant remittances, on-farm production and many NTFPs other than P. africana. In contrast, a tiny minority of well-connected elites secures most of the benefits. Prices paid to wealthy elite exporters (currently USD 6 per kg, compared to USD 0.33 per kg or less paid to harvesters (Figure 3) ) are withheld from bark harvesters and MOCAP.
As P. africana is a slow growing species subject to destructive harvest, it could be argued that neither the 1-year ban (1991) (1992) nor the EU ban, which barely lasted three years, have been long enough periods to allow wild populations to recover from decades of destructive harvesting.
A green economy goes into the red
The Prunus africana trade in Cameroon could be divided into five phases. Phase 1 (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) 
Theme
Rhetoric Reality
A 5-year rotation times after first bark harvest
Sustainable harvest of 50% of trunk bark using the "quarter method" needs to be based on a 5-year rotation. This is the basis of the 5 blocks of the Prunus Allocation Unit (PAU) within Mount Cameroon National Park (Eben-Ebai 2011). One of the reasons for the massive over-estimate of bark yield from Mount Cameroon (4438 t/ yr) (Ewusi et al. 1996) was the assumption of a 4-year rotation.
The five-year rotation is too short. A detailed study by Nkeng (2009) found that at least a seven-year rotation was necessary. If wild harvest continues, a 7-8 year minimum rotation is needed. The challenge is that longer rotation times mean significantly lower annual bark harvests. For Mount Cameroon, Eben-Ebai (2011) has calculated a 6 years rotation yields 297.902 tons vs. 377,482 t of fresh bark), 21% less bark than from a 5-yr rotation. In contrast to Euwsi et al.'s (1996) "high estimate" of 4438 t/yr from Mount Cameroon, the 2012 annual bark yield from Block 1 was only 57 t. With a 7-year rotation, this would be further reduced to less than 40 t per year (100 times less than Ewusi et al. 's (1996) estimate).
The "two bark quarters" technique is sustainable.
Only trees with diameter at breast height (dbh) > 30 cm can be debarked. Trees with dbh < 50 cm should be debarked with two strips in opposite sides, each no wider than 1/4 of the tree circumference. Lateral roots with a minimum diameter of 20 cm on trees > dbh 50 cm can be debarked. Each debarked tree should completely recover before subsequent debarking (Ministry of Agriculture 1986; Ndibi and Kay 1997).
In moist sites, bark regrowth occurs if this technique is used, but in dry sites, bark does not recover. In lower altitude sites, even healthy P. africana trees are attacked by wood-bring beetles. Debarking is often followed by reduction in tree crown size due to shoot and branch die-off as a result of water stress due to 50% bark loss (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993; Foaham et al. 2009; Nkeng et al. 2009 ). Water stress is exacerbated by root debarking. In most cases, far more bark is taken than is recommended: "Despite training and the best practice standards and decree, the majority (61%) of trees in all the main harvest zones surveyed were debarked unsustainably … Only 9% were harvested according to the Two Quarters technique, mainly in privatelyowned plantations and some areas of Mount Cameroon controlled by MOCAP-CIG (Ingram et al. 2009 ). Even so, even "correct" bark stripping damages the cambium and inhibits bark regeneration.
Inventories & quota setting
"… data sources were combined [to] create a management plan which proposes a quota on the basis of inventories, verifies harvesting techniques and contains realistic control and monitoring regulations" The National Management Plan included inventories that used different methods, with very different results, even for the same locations. Recommendations that inventories take tree crown health into account (Nkeng 2009) were not followed. The best managed site is the PAU in Mount Cameroon National Park. Previous sampling to establish yields has varied hugely for Mount Cameroon, from 4438 t/yr to 330 t/yr to 178 t/yr and an actual yield in 2012 of just 57 t. To avoid inaccurate estimates, GiZ/KfW recently supported a 100% inventory. This cost 15 million CFA (around USD 30,000) compared to a bark harvest worth USD 17,100 in 2013).
Sampling methods
Adaptive cluster sample method (ACS) is widely considered to be the best method for wild Prunus africana populations (e.g. Ingram et al. 2009; Betti 2011; Betti et al. 2013) Two concerns about the National Management Plan are that: inventories were based on very different sampling methods and the ACS overestimates plant populations (see Morrison et al. 2008) . Based on a comparison of 5 different sampling designs, grid-based systematic designs were more efficient and practical than ACS or other methods.
Participatory, decentralized management
The Prunus allocation units (PAUs) have been participatively defined and developed with input from stakeholders, particularly during Prunus platform meetings, community forests, SNV and the Forest Governance Facility from 2007 to 2009 ).
As MINOF does not allocate enough funds for inventories and management plans in PAUs, these are either funded by donors (MCNP), ITTO (e.g. Tchabal Mbabo) or by permit holders who export bark and directly fund ANAFOR staff. Instead of wider participation and devolution of power, centralized control continues through complex permitting processes, with concentration of power through exporter elites. In 2007, just 9 companies received quotas, one of which (Afrimed) continues to dominate the export trade (Figure 4 ). MINOF policymakers. At the time of the EU ban, the lack of a separate supply chain for cultivated P. africana bark had resulted in the concentration of power over P. africana production through wild harvest (Figure 3 ), rather than devolving profits and production to the thousands of farmers who cultivate P. africana. Based on interviews carried out in NW Cameroon, 80% of the actors said they knew why the EU trade ban was implemented (Anoncho 2014). Awareness about the reasons for the ban is high (poor P. africana management, no evidence of sustainable exploitation, Cameroon not respecting the attributed quota, and the quality exported was not the best due to bark substitution). Those most affected by EU ban were a powerful Cameroonian elite and the European pharmaceutical companies processing P. africana bark. The result was a process of lobbying, advocacy to overturn the ban: a mutiny over the bounty characterized by advocacy dressed up as research (Table 2) . Phase 5: 2011 and beyond. The question remains on how to go forward following advocacy and lobbying that overturned an effective international policy instrument (the EU ban on trade) that would have allowed P. africana stocks to recover? Instead of decentralization through local participation that was supposed to occur under the National Management Plan ), power and profits from commercial P. africana harvest are now in the hands of one or two elite exporters, and are now more centralized than at any time since the period 1976-1986.
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose
Following the announcement of the EU ban in 2007, the Government of Cameroon wrote to the EU in May 2007 undertaking to restrict the harvesting of Prunus africana, promising that: "rigorous monitoring and strict control of harvests in situ, will continue".
7 While district and national bans are relatively easy to lift through the influence of political elites, the 2007 EU ban required international influence for it to be lifted. Inventory and monitoring activities also need to be funded if they are to be conducted and sustained to lobby at the CITES Review of Significant Trade Recommendations meeting at Lake Naivasha, Kenya (8-11 September 2008).
In the following month, the Minister of Forestry and Wildlife requested that FAO lead a process to support the development of a management plan that would result in the lifting of the EU ban. FAO commissioned CIFOR to undertake the work. As Ingram (2014) describes, "this forced actors to work together to bricolage new governance arrangements, dictated by international conventions and based on revised formal regulations, customary best practices and projects. The resulting arrangements appear a framework for more sustainable livelihoods in the long term". From an institutional perspective, "bricolage" was not good enough. There were many reservations about the poor quality of the report within CIFOR and it was recommended that the report should not be released. However, as a tool for advocacy and lobbying, the National Management Plan was ideal. Released through the FAO website under the CIFOR/FAO brand, it was submitted to the EU Scientific Review Group (SRG). The EU-SRG, unaware of concerns about the quality of the "bricolage" report, accepted it at face value and in 2010, agreed to lift the EU trade ban. Recent interviews with high-level decision-makers in Cameroon and Europe attest to the important role the Ingram et al. (2009) report had in influencing the EU-SRG to lift the trade ban.
The gaps between rhetoric and reality continue to be apparent in advocacy about P. africana and livelihoods, sustainable wild harvest and policies on "incentive based conservation" (Tables 1 and  2 
Impact of the 2007 EU Trade ban
The EU ban was "a tragedy for livelihoods ... abruptly ending exports and leading to a two-year period of uncertainty with little to no income for any actors in the chain" (Ingram 2014) Almost half (46%) of the actors in the P. africana supply chain considered the EU trade ban a fair decision, with a further 14% considering that the EU ban was predictable, given the destructive exploitation of P. africana stocks (Anoncho 2014). Only 5% of respondents said the EU decision was unfair. In NW Cameroon, which is more remote than Mount Cameroon area in the southwest, there is a high level of awareness of the 2007 EU ban, with 54% of actors aware during 2007 with an additional 38% becoming an aware of the EU ban in the years after the ban was in place.
Development & release of the National Management Plan (NMP) in order to have the EU ban lifted.
The 2007 EU ban "forced actors to work together to 'bricolage' new governance arrangements, dictated by international conventions and based on revised formal regulations, customary best practices and projects. The resulting arrangements appear a framework for more sustainable livelihoods in the long term" (Ingram 2014) It was recommended that the "bricolage" report should not be released as it included inventories based on different methods and recommended harvest quotas for forests such as Kilum-Ijum forest reserve where Steward (2001) had clearly shown harvest was unsustainable. Rather than being a "framework for more sustainable livelihoods in the long term", the report was primarily used as a tool to convince the EU's SRG to lift the ban on P. africana bark imports into the EU.
National Management Plan as a regional model
The National Management Plan for P. africana in Cameroon is a "pragmatic management plan for the sustainable exploitation of Prunus africana in the short and long term. This plan is innovative for Cameroon. It is also relevant for all countries in Africa where Prunus potentially could be exploited".
Although the management plans within Prunus allocation units (PAUs) are the basis of continued wild harvest, it was apparent from CIFOR research (Cerruti et al. 2008) published before the National Management Plan ) of the massive gap between goals of the 1994 Forestry Policy, which required detailed forest management plans (FMPs) from logging companies and the reality. A total of 14 years after the legislation was in place, the government had still not implementing "effective minimum sustainability safeguards and that, in 2006, 68% of the timber production was still carried out as though no improved management rules were in place". The same applies to P. africana today.
Harvest within National Parks as a policy outcome of the National Management Plan.
Commercial harvest of P. africana bark within Mount Cameroon National Park (MCNP) should be permitted "due to the livelihood and cultural aspects associated with Prunus africana exploitation and seeks to boost community participation in the management and protection of the resources of the park, as well as generate income" ).
As recommended over 20 years ago, commercial harvest should be phased out of Mount Cameroon National Park and forest reserves in favor of cultivation by local farmers (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993) . While onfarm P. africana is building up, licensed seed and wildling harvesters should be allowed to collect seed and wildings from MCNP to supply locally run nurseries around the national park. (Loo 2011) contributes to the idealistic rhetoric about sustainable wild harvest.
10 Neither video mentions the need for cultivation as a long-term solution. Loo (2011) , for example, cites the 2007 EU ban as the reason why MOCAP harvesters haven't been using their bark-processing machine, thus adding value locally. However, the reason for non-use of the machine is that buyers will not purchase milled bark because it is easily adulterated and obscures the identity of the source species. Advocacy using the National Management Plan (Ingram et al. 8 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VyGUMPGYQ6o 
Theme Rhetoric Reality
Trade from cultivated P. africana stocks Significant quantities of bark in the export trade are from cultivation
The majority of exported bark is from wild harvest. Although many farmers have planted P. africana since 1977 (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993) and cultivation is a viable economic proposition (Cunningham et al. 2002) , relatively few farmers are harvesting bark for sale. Some are so discouraged by poor prices they are paid for bark that they are cutting down their trees for use as timber (personal communication from P. Tchouto, 2014). In west Cameroon, although more than 94% of farmers plant, at least 90% of P. africana bark is still exploited from the forest (ICRAF/ IRAD/University of Dschang 2008). Approximately 70% had never been harvested (Ingram et al. 2014) . The EU ban stimulated commercial farmers and pharmaceutical companies to consider partnerships for cultivation (Ingram 2014) . Separate supply chains for cultivated bark, and farmers groups who cooperate in selling container loads of traceable high-quality bark for fair prices, are required.
Use of the "regeneration tax"
The regeneration tax funds P. africana cultivation Most informants are unclear about what happens to this tax. It is collected specifically to fund reforestation efforts for P. africana, yet MINFOF admit that they do little or no work of this kind.
Recognition of extensive P. africana cultivation by local farmers "These facts demonstrate the previously unrecognized large-scale of domestication" (Ingram 2014) The extent of P. africana cultivation by local farmers was recognized over 20 years ago (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993) . A follow-up study showed that P. africana cultivation was an economically viable option (Cunningham et al. 2003) . However the production potential of planted stands is still poorly documented.
Conservation of P. africana genetic diversity
Cutlivated stocks of P. africana are "an important genetic source" Ingram 2014) For years, Plantecam supplied seed to farmers. However, seed collection has been primarily opportunistic and not based on a systematic attempt at genetic selection, thus the genetic value of much cultivated stock is unknown. A comparative analysis of genetic diversity among cultivated and natural stands in the northwest region indicated no significant difference, indicating that the current domestication strategy helps conserve the genetic diversity found in natural populations (Avana et al. 2008) Cultivated P. africana trees should be considered wild for permitting purposes.
Cultivated trees are the first generation from wild collected seed or wildings, so should be considered wild and must come under MINFOF wild harvest permit system
This may be a strategy to get additional taxes and retain control, rather than allow decentralized production and trade through separate, traceable supply chains. Separate supply chains have been implemented for farmed CITES listed species as diverse as orchids and crocodiles and are possible for Aquilaria resin (agarwood) as well (Espinoza et al. 2014 ).
Debarking of cultivated trees & the "two quarters method"
Farmers are so used to hearing about the "two quarters methods" that they want to apply this to trees on farm.
It is likely to be more economically viable to fell cultivated P. africana trees, to harvest 100% of bark, sell the timber and branchwood (for timber and fuel). Table 3 . Green production and red herrings: A reality check on P. africana cultivation.
Back to the future: cultivating a green economy
There is general consensus between researchers, advocacy groups and farmers that cultivation is necessary to sustain future trade. Over 20 years ago, detailed recommendations were made for a shift from wild P. africana bark harvest to supplies from cultivated stocks (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993) . Although many of those recommendations were followed by ICRAF (Gyau et al. 2013) , the Limbe Botanic Garden (Sunderland et al. 2002) and many other local organizations, gaps in understanding about cultivation remain (Table 3 ). The biggest gap of all is the lack of a separate supply chain for cultivated P. africana bark. Re-instating an EU ban on wild harvested bark exports with a traceable supply chain in place would produce a very different outcome. Local farmers are overwhelmingly in favor of selling their bark at a fair price and avoiding the taxes currently imposed on wild harvested bark. These taxes represent 57% of the farm-gate price for cultivated bark ( Figure 6 ). With tagging of cultivated trees, the process of developing a separate supply chain for cultivated P. africana bark is underway.
Yet at the local livelihood level, far more people would benefit, with considerably less effort, from policy changes and market access that encouraged cultivation. In 2008, before CIFOR's involvement in developing the National Management Plan started, it was recommended that CIFOR's P. africana research focus on cultivation, not on wild harvest, on the basis of recommendations over the past 20 years that cultivation was the most practical way of sustaining supplies (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993; Cunningham et al. 2002) . This advice was ignored; the National Management Plan was produced, and the EU ban was lifted after 3 years. It is in the best interest of pharmaceutical companies whose customers are increasingly aware of Fair Trade and "green economies" to help develop traceable supply chains for cultivated P. africana bark. This is sorely needed. From 2003 to 2011, the source of more than half (57%) of the P. africana bark exported from 2003 to 2011 was unknown, as no official distinction was made between legal and illegally harvested bark (Ingram 2014) . The current GiZ/PSMNR-SW-funded inventory of P. africana on farms is therefore very timely as is the availability of new technologies that can facilitate tracking, such as barcoding and smartphones used to read barcodes on sealed bags of cultivated bark.
Discussion
Worldwide, there are many instances where research or monitoring have failed to influence policy decisions or positive actions on natural resource use or conservation. Linklater's (2003) global synthesis of rhino research, for example, showed that all rhino species were declining while rhino research outputs had increased. P. africana is a similar case of the "knowing but not doing" gap. Habel et al. (2013) , identified not one gap, but three gaps between conservation science and conservation action: (i) the "knowing-doing gap"; (ii) a thematic gap between the topics addressed by conservation science and the problems faced in conservation; and (iii) a disciplinary gap, with Habel et al. (2013) calling for interdisciplinary research at multiple scales in the field of biodiversity and conservation science. In the P. africana case, bridging the "'knowing-doing gap' requires transdisciplinary research (Max-Neef 2005) that goes way beyond conservation science into political ecology and environmental economics.
In 1994, when P. africana was listed in CITES Appendix II at CoP9, many factors related to "nondetriment findings" (NDF) were known. These were: (i) the scale of the commercial bark trade on stocks depleted by habitat loss and destructive harvest; (ii) that P. africana populations across Africa and Madagascar were chemotypically (Martinelli et al. 1986 ) and genetically distinct (Barker et al. 1992) ; (iii) Figure 6 . Bark production from cultivation will bring better profits with less effort as long as government officials allow cultivated P. africana to be recognized as cultivated and not "wild because they are first generation produced from wild collected wildings or seed".
that bark regeneration in drier sites was limited and crown die-back occurred; (iv) that poor governance was a key factor behind over-harvest, including within high conservation priority areas and (v) that small-scale farmers in Cameroon were producing many P. africana in agroforestry systems and it was important to phase out harvesting of wild stocks and shift to bark exports from cultivated stocks (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993; Tchoundjeu et al. 2002) .
What wasn't fully appreciated then, but is known now, are six additional factors that need to be considered in NDF. First, climate change influences on P. africana populations (Mbatude et al. 2012; Vinceti et al. 2013) . The range of the species has been affected by past climate change and the modeled distribution of P. africana indicates that the species is likely to be negatively affected in future, with an expected decrease in distribution by 2050 (Vinceti et al. 2013) . Second, although pioneering work had been undertaken on chemotypic (Martinelli et al. 1986 ) and genetic variation in P. africana (Barker et al. 1994) , the extent of variation across different sites, and the need for conserving this variation of P. africana populations remains. This genetic and chemotypic variation reflects ancient dispersal routes and evolution of P. africana in separate and vulnerable montane forest "islands" in Africa and Madagascar (Kadu et al. 2011 (Kadu et al. , 2012a Vinceti et al. 2013 ). Third, current destructive harvesting practices affect the reproductive future and genetic diversity of exploited populations (Farwig et al. 2008) . Fourth, matrix population modeling based on fieldwork in Cameroon showed that P. africana population growth rates are most sensitive to death or low survival rates of the large trees producing the most seed and that exploitation of large P. africana trees is unsustainable and leads to population decline (Stewart 2001) . Fifth, that due to the cyanogenic glycosides it contains, P. africana is a fundamentally important species in the diet of rare primates such as red colobus (Chapman and Chapman 1999; Chapman et al. 2003 ) and black-and-white colobus monkeys (Fashing 2004) . Six, two types of additional "collateral damage" accompanying P. africana harvest are not being taken into account:
• bushmeat hunting;
• felling of "ladder trees" and the lianas that bind them together.
All P. africana harvesters are men, often with hunting experience. In Mount Cameroon National Park, and possibly elsewhere, harvesters are encouraged to climb P. africana trees using makeshift ladders using local materials (small trees bound with lianas).
A 1000 t quota represents an estimated 18,000 P. africana trees being debarked, as many "ladder trees" felled and at least two lianas per ladder (36,000 lianas). This may have no effect on species populations or the forest, but it does need attention. Finally, despite the firm recommendation that no P. africana harvesting should take place within the areas set aside for Afromontane forest conservation (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993) Lifting the ban on P. africana exports from Cameroon, while zero quotas were in place for competitor countries (such as Burundi, DRC and Kenya) created an ideal business opportunity for elite exporters. In theory, as with timber concessions in Cameroon, allocation of PAUs was meant to occur after an advertised, open, competitive bidding process. In practice, even where local organizations are involved, they have to link up with exporter elites who through MINFOF, are granted exploitation permits after the exporters have paid ANAFOR staff to conduct inventories on their behalf. In 2012, although Pharmafric was granted a quota in the remote, "resource rich frontier" of the Adamoua plateau (which has five PAUs) we were told that harvested quantities within their allocated PAU were far lower than they expected. Despite Afrimed having a history of paying low prices and of unsustainable P. africana bark harvests (Meuer 2008) , it continues to be the dominant exporter. Afrimed is part of Afrigroup, a very wellconnected business consisting of four companies under the umbrella of a large Cameroonian bank. Figure 5 ). For example, the 2012 bark quota (658.675 t) would be worth over USD 3.9 million. It is no wonder, therefore, that a request was made through ANAFOR to the EU SRG in February 2014 to increase the 2014 quota to 1092 t, as this would be worth USD 6.5 million.
We now know more than enough to bridge the "knowing but not doing gap". Many of the problems that Ingram et al. (2009) sought to resolve -unsustainable harvest, quotas greater than wild sustainable stocks and low income to wild bark harvesters -persist. So do the contradictions between decentralization implicit in Cameroon's 1994 forestry law and highly centralized power over rights to harvest special forest products, including P. africana. But the ripple effects of assuming that Cameroon's wild harvest model ) can be applied elsewhere are serious. These include P. africana bark assessments that were carried out in and around national parks in Burundi and in DRC (Betti 2012; ITTO-CITES 2012) . These conservation areas occur in Africa's most biodiverse ecoregion, with an extremely high number of threatened and endemic species. More than ever before, pragmatic policies need to be based on thorough research and on-theground reality checks.
